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Abstract
Private browsing has been a popular privacy feature built into all mainstream
browsers since 2005. However, despite the prevalent use, the security of this
feature has received little attention from the research community. To the
best of our knowledge, no study has existed that systematically evaluates the
security of private browsing across all major browsers and from all angles:
not only examining the memory, but also the underlying database structure
on the disk and the web traffic. In this paper, we present an up-to-date
and comprehensive analysis of private browsing across the four most popular
web browsers: IE, Firefox, Chrome and Safari. We report that all browsers
under study suffer from a variety of vulnerabilities, many of which have not
been reported or known before. The problems are generally caused by the
following factors: a lax control of permission to allow extensions to run in
the private mode with unrestricted privilege; inconsistent implementations
of the underlying SQLite database between the private and usual modes;
the neglect of the cross-mode interference when the two modes are run in
parallel; a lack of attention to side-channel timing attacks, etc. All of the
attacks have been experimentally verified with countermeasures proposed.
Keywords: private browsing, web security, user privacy, system security
1. Introduction
In 2005, Safari first introduced private browsing, a feature that enables a
user to surf the Internet without leaving traces on her local computer, such
1A preliminary short version of the paper was presented at DPM’13 [12].
as history, cookies and temporary files [1]. Since then, all other mainstream
browsers have added the same feature, including Internet Explorer (IE) [18],
Chrome [15] and Firefox [16].
Although the basic aim of private browsing is the same, the implementa-
tions vary greatly across different browsers. This adds significant complexity
to the subject. In USENIX Security’10, Aggarwal, Burzstein, Jackson and
Boneh first initiated the study of the security of private browsing in modern
browsers and discovered several vulnerabilities [1]. In particular, they studied
the dire impact of browser extensions on private browsing in Firefox (v3.6).
A year later, Said et al. continued the study of private browsing [14]. They
focused on examining the content in the volatile memory and found that arti-
facts from the private session remained in memory even after the session had
been closed. Recently, in ESORICS’13, Lerner et al. presented a software
tool that allows automatic verification of the browser extensions’ compliance
with the private mode [8]. The tool was mainly tested on Firefox extensions,
although in principle it could be easily extended to other browsers.
Apart from these three papers, the security of private browsing seems
to have been almost entirely neglected by the security research community.
To date, no study has existed that systematically analyses the security of
private browsing across all major web browsers and from all angles: not just
examining the memory, but also the underlying database structure on the
disk and web traffic.
We believe this lack of attention is disproportionate to the importance of
the subject. Over the past five years since 2008, private browsing has been
extensively used by a significant portion of Internet users (19% according to
a survey [1]) to protect their privacy during web navigation [8]. Given the
prevalent use of private browsing and the fact that many users are relying
on it for privacy, it is important to ensure that private browsing is really as
“private” as the browser vendors have claimed.
In this paper, we will present an independent and systematic evaluation
of the current state of private browsing in all mainstream browsers. Our
contributions are summarised below.
• Threat model: We refine a threat model for private browsing based
on adjusting a previous model (due to Aggarwal et al. [1]) in order to
capture more realistic threats in practice.
• Discovery of new attacks: We have performed a series of concrete
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experiments and discovered a number of new vulnerabilities across all
the web browsers under study.
• Validation of known attacks: We have tested all previously known
vulnerabilities against the latest versions of web browsers and are able
to confirm that some still remain unfixed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the re-
search methodology used for this study. Section 3 defines a threat model for
private browsing. The next two sections, 4 and 5, present a series of experi-
ments to expose vulnerabilities of private browsing against local and remote
attackers respectively. Section 6 discusses countermeasures for discovered
vulnerabilities. Finally, Section 7 concludes our study and suggests future
research.
2. Research methodology
In this research work, we took a forensic approach to collect and anal-
yse residual data left on the host computer after the private browsing ses-
sion. Virtualisation was used to prevent any cross-contamination between
experiments. In particular, VMware Player (a free version of VMware) was
installed [20]. In terms of the operating system, Windows 7 was chosen
based on its popularity among the Internet users. The latest versions of the
four most popular browsers (as in April, 2013 [19]) were installed: Mozilla
Firefox (19.0), Apple Safari (5.1.7), Google Chrome (25.0.1364.97) and IE
(10.0.9200.16521).
For each experiment a fresh Windows installation with a single web
browser was used. The experiments were carried out for each browser to
investigate possible residual data left in memory or disk after private navi-
gation. A set of freely distributed third party tools were chosen (see Table
1), which makes it possible for the reader to replicate the experiments. Fi-
nally, all the software tools developed during the course of this research work
are released as open source (see [33]). This should help browser vendors to
evaluate the security of their products and improve accordingly.
A group of targeted websites were chosen to imitate a real user’s behavior
in one browsing session, and to examine a variety of elements involved in web
browsing. Table 2 lists the group of targeted websites and their character-
istics. In each experiment, the targeted websites were visited in the private
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Software Firefox Chrome IE Safari
VMware Player
√ √ √ √
WinHex
√ √ √ √
Index.dat Analyser N/A N/A
√
N/A
SQLite browser
√ √
N/A
√
SQLite manager
√ √
N/A
√
Table 1: List of third-party software used in each experiment
Website Characteristics
http://www.samy.pl/evercookie Ever-cookies include flash cookie,
IsoData2 and HTML 5 storage3
https://www.twitter.com/time Tweets streams and sizeable photos
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian Unicode transmission and videos
http://www.youtube.com Videos and online advertising
https://www.facebook.com Online chat and online advertising
Table 2: List of targeted websites and their characteristics
mode. The subsequent investigation involved closing the private session and
searching for any evidence left on the computer. In most scenarios, this in-
cluded searching for specific keywords such as URL, cookies, or other content
of visited web pages.
3. Threat model
The threat model for private browsing is defined in terms of the attacker’s
capabilities and their goals. In 2010, Aggarwal et al. defined one threat model
for private browsing in [1]. Our model is similar to theirs but with some
differences, as we will explain. Same as in [1], we will categorise attackers
into two types: local and remote attackers.
Local attack. A local attacker is someone who has physical access to a
user’s machine. The threat model defined in [1] restricts the local attack to
“after the fact” forensics. In other words, it is assumed that an attacker can-
not have physical access to the user’s computer before the private browsing
2Siverlight Isolated Storage
3This includes HTML5 Session Storage, Local Storage, Global Storage and Database
Storage
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session (otherwise, the attacker may just install a key logger and the attack
would be trivial). On the other hand, it is acknowledged in [1] that the user
may have installed third-party browser extensions before the private session.
Our model about a local attacker is essentially the same as that in [1] but
with one difference: we explicitly assume at least one of the installed third-
party extensions were written by an attacker. Hence, instead of surveying
the third-party extensions and speculating their behavior as in [1], we chose
to write our own extensions as if from an attacker’s perspective. This allows
capturing the exact impact of browser extensions more directly.
Remote attack. For remote attacks, we assume the attacker is capable
to engage with the user in a web browsing session over HTTP(S). This typ-
ically happens when a user navigates to a web site that is controlled by an
attacker. The goal of the attacker is to detect whether the user is in the pri-
vate mode4. As compared with the model in [1], we have excluded the threat
of the remote website tracking the user (e.g., based on IP addresses [13]
or unique browser fingerprints [4]). This is because in all browsers, private
browsing has never been designed to prevent web tracking (see specifications
in [15, 16, 17, 18]). Hence, it is not reasonable to insist on a privacy fea-
ture that the product is not designed for. (We refer interested readers to
other privacy-preserving tools such as TOR [29] for the prevention of web
tracking.)
Against the defined threat model, we conducted a series of experiments to
assess the security of private browsing among the four most popular browsers:
Firefox, Chrome, IE and Safari. Table 3 summarises the attacks, and their
applicability to specific browsers. Details of each attack will be explained
below.
4. Local attacks
4.1. Summary of previously known attacks
Domain Name System (DNS). DNS caching has long been known
as a major threat to private browsing [1]. This vulnerability is caused due
to the operating system caching the DNS queries sent by a web browser
4Given the often negative connotation of using the private mode for viewing adult
websites (see [1]), we consider the fact of using the private mode a privacy feature by
itself. If the remote website learns the user is in the private mode, it may present more
adult-oriented web content or advertisements.
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Firefox Chrome IE Safari
Domain name system
√ √ √ √
Memory inspection
√ √ √ √
File timestamp − √ − √
Index.dat * N/A N/A
√
N/A
SQLite database crash *
√ √
N/A
√
SQLite added bookmark *
√ √
N/A
√
Extension *
√ √ − √
Cross-mode Interference * N/A
√
N/A N/A
Hyperlink attack
√ √ √ √
Timing attack *
√ √ − √
Table 3: List of attacks and their applicability to each browser. Those marked with *
contain new results discovered by our study, while others correspond to attacks that have
been previously known but validated again by our study.
regardless if it is in the private mode or not. The results of our testing on
DNS caching have confirmed that, three years after it was reported in [1],
this vulnerability still persists in all browsers. Some third-party extensions
have been developed to address this issue [21, 22], but none of them has been
adopted by browser vendors.
Memory Inspection. Volatile memory can be a remarkable source of
information for forensic investigations. In 2011, Said et al. reported that
artifacts from a private browsing session were found left in the primary mem-
ory after the exit of the session [14]. We conducted experiments to verify if
the same vulnerability still existed in the latest versions of browsers.
WinHex [23], a popular forensic tool, was used to extract content from
RAM. The experimental results revealed that artifacts from private naviga-
tion persisted in memory even after the browser was closed. They included
information such as visited URLs, password and cookies (see Fig. 1).
File timestamp. Timestamps are valuable evidence in any forensic in-
vestigation [2]. They often serve to reveal the occurrence of an event at a
precise time. In an operating system, each file or folder has a timestamp of
the “last modified date”. In [1], Aggarwal et al. compared the “last modified
date” for files in the profile directory before and after the private browsing
test using Firefox. They found the timestamps had been changed while the
sizes of the files remained the same. Based on this observation, the authors
suggested that an attacker could deduce the occurrence of a private session
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Figure 1: Results of memory inspection after the exit of private session in Firefox. The
URL https://twitter.com/time was an artifact left from the session.
in the past. Our experiments showed that the reported vulnerability had
been fixed in the latest version of Firefox. However, the same vulnerability
was found to exist in Chrome and Safari.
4.2. Index.dat
The Index.dat files are binary format log files used by IE to store the
user’s browsing history, cookies, temporary files, etc. A number of such files
are dispersed under different paths in Windows 7, with each recording specific
information about the visited web pages.
In order to evaluate the correlation between the private mode (also called
InPrivate in IE) and ‘Index.dat’ files, Index.dat Analyser was installed in
order to read and analyse binary format log files [24]. After the navigation
of the targeted websites in the private mode, Index.dat Analyser was used
to scrutinise residual traces left in the files. Our experiments showed that,
unlike in some earlier versions of IE, the latest version successfully removed
the traces of private navigation: no history, cookies or cache records were
found.
However, we found that adding bookmarks in the IE private mode could
lead to information leakage. The browser allows users to freely add book-
marks just as in the usual mode. Bookmarks added during a private session
were stored as standalone files under the %USERPROFILE%\Favorites direc-
tory with timestamps of the file creation time. On the other hand, there is no
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Browser File directory
Firefox %APPDATA%\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<Random Value>\<FileName>.sqlite
Chrome %APPDATA%\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\<FileName>.sqlite
Safari %APPDATA%\Local\Apple Computer\Safari\<FileName>.db
Table 4: Paths of the SQLite database files in different browsers
matching URL for the added bookmark in Histoy.IE5\index.dat. A cross
comparison between these files could allow an attacker to deduce that the
bookmark was added in the private mode; the timestamp of the bookmark
file would indicate when the private browsing was used. The attacker may
sometimes get false positives as the user may have added a bookmark in the
usual mode without visiting the link (e.g., right-click over a hyperlink to add
it to the bookmarks). However, the false negatives are always zero.
4.3. SQLite Database
SQLite is ANSI-C-based open source database used by Firefox, Chrome
and Safari to store historical records of browsing activities [6]. The database
is structured as a single file saved under the browser’s profile folder. The
paths of the SQLite files used by different browsers are summarized in Table
4.
To study the correlation between the private browsing activities and the
underlying SQLite database, we installed SQLite Browser [11] and SQLite
Manager [25] to examine the records in detail. Our experiments reveal two
vulnerabilities: one is related to the application crash, and the other one
related to adding bookmarks.
Application Crash. There are many reasons why a browser program
may terminate in an unexpected way. For example, the program may be
manually terminated by the user due to unresponsiveness; there may be a
sudden power loss; the web page contains too much HTML data to load in
the browser; the Javascript or Java plug-in embedded in the web page may be
too busy to handle the computational load, etc. The critical question is that:
if the program terminates in an unexpected way, will it leave unexpected
evidence on disk?
In Firefox, the SQLite database uses Write Ahead Logging (WAL) mode
to implement database transactions such as atomic commit and rollback.
In this mode, WAL files are created at the first connection to the SQLite
database and are deleted when the last connection to the database is closed.
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However, in the event of application crash database connections are not closed
cleanly and the WAL files will remain on disk until the browser is restarted.
We observed that the WAL files left from the private mode always had the
zero size (since there were not database updates), while the WAL files left
from the usual mode had non-zero size. Hence, based on the size of a WAL
file and the timestamp of it, an attacker will be able to deduce that a private
session occurred at a specific time. However, restarting the browser in the
usual mode will remove this evidence.
Chrome implements the SQLite database transactions using Journal files
instead of WAL mode. To speed up the loading, the browser uses two SQLite
databases to store the history records: one named “History” and the other
in the form of “History Index YYYY-MM” (for example, “History Index
2013-04’’ for April of 2013). In the usual mode, the browser uses the
two journal files for the two databases respectively. However in the private
mode, it just uses one journal file (only for the “History” database). All
journal files will remain on disk in the event of application crash or power
loss. Based on the existence of only one journal file, an attacker can deduce
that a private session occurred and the timestamp of the file reveals when.
Similar to Firefox, restarting the browser in the usual mode will remove the
evidence.
The case of Safari is more serious. Unlike Firefox and Chrome that only
use in-memory SQLite database for private browsing and do not write the
visited websites to the database file on disk, Safari actually writes records
of the visited websites to the database file and removes them later. Only
when the browser is closed normally will those history records be removed.
Through experimentation, we found that if the browser was closed in an
abnormal way (e.g., a crash or forced termination), the records of visited
websites in the private mode would remain in the database. These records
will persist on disk even after the browser is restarted. This flaw poses a
serious threat to the user’s privacy.
Adding Bookmarks. In Firefox, after visiting the targeted websites
and adding a bookmark in the private mode, SQLite Manager and SQLite
Browser [25] were used to examine the database file named places.sqlite.
This database keeps records of all visited URLs and added bookmarks.
Within this database, two are particularly relevant: moz places, which stores
the visited websites; and moz bookmarks, which stores bookmarks.
Our investigation revealed that a bookmark added during the private
mode was recorded in both tables. This was the same as the implementation
9
in the usual mode, except that the “title” and “last visit date” fields were
deleted (see Fig. 2). A comparison of these two tables would disclose that
the bookmark was added during the private mode at a specific time. It is
worse than the earlier IE case, since the evidence is definite: i.e., zero false
positive and zero false negative.
(a) Bookmark record in moz bookmarks
(b) Record in moz places with deleted last visit date
Figure 2: Adding a bookmark in the Firefox private mode
Similarly, in Chrome, the URL for bookmarks added in the private mode
could be found in the “history” SQLite database. Contrary to the imple-
mentation in the usual mode, the “visit count” field was set to 0 and the
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Figure 3: Chrome history SQLite. The highlighted record corresponds to a bookmark
added in the private mode. The record persists in the database with the “visit count”
field merely set to 0 and “hidden” set to 1.
“hidden” field set to 1 (see Fig. 3). Hence, a search for “visit count=0 and
hidden=1” would conveniently disclose websites bookmarked in the private
mode with detailed timestamps, which in turn would indicate precisely when
private browsing was used.
The case of Safari is the worst. Under the normal operation, Safari re-
moves the browsing history in the private mode when the program is closed.
However, we found that as long as the user added one bookmark during the
private navigation, all the websites that were visited during the private ses-
sion would remain in the SQLite database – more specifically, in the PageURL
table of the WebpageIcons.db database file. We have reported this bug to
Apple, and learned that it would be fixed in a newer version of Safari5.
4.4. Extensions
The effects of browser extensions on private browsing were studied by
Aggarwal et al. in 2010 [1]. Their study was mainly focused on Firefox
extensions and the adopted approach was to survey the most popular 40
Firefox extensions and analyse their behavior. We extended their work in two
5After we filed a bug report (#14685058) about this flaw to Apple, we received a reply
from Apple on 12 August, 2013: “Engineering has determined that this is not to be fixed”.
We further requested Apple to justify their decision. On 18 August, Apple replied again:
“After much deliberation, engineering has removed this feature.”
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Figure 4: Chrome extension recording user activities in a private browsing session
aspects. First, instead of analysing third party extensions (and speculating
their intentions), we wrote our own extensions; this allows us to more directly
capture the impact of extensions on private browsing. Furthermore, the
developed extensions cover not just Firefox, but also Chrome, Safari and IE.
(Note that in 2010 when the paper [1] was published, Safari and IE did not
yet support extensions.)
Chrome Extension. Chrome extensions are designed to provide addi-
tional functionality and augment default browsing behaviour. Chrome ex-
tensions are based on web technologies, with Javascript used for providing
functionality, and user interfaces based on HTML and CSS. [27]. For the
demonstration purpose, we wrote a Chrome extension, called Incognito In-
spector [33]. Once this extension was enabled in the Chrome private mode,
it was able to record detailed user activities for the duration of a private
browsing session, including when the tabs were opened and closed, which
web pages were visited and at which time, how the user flipped between tabs
and windows, etc (see Fig. 4). These details can be sent to a remote server
in real time.
In the latest version of Chrome, extensions are disabled in the private
mode by default. This “disable-by-default” policy significantly alleviates the
threat. However, the fact that Chrome allows the private and usual modes to
run in parallel renders this policy ineffective, as we will explain in Section 4.5.
Safari Extension. To illustrate the risks posed by extensions during
private browsing in Safari, we developed a similar inspector extension [33]
for Safari, which is able to record details of the user’s activities within a
12
Figure 5: Safari extension showing the retrieved history of visited website during a private
browsing session in a drop-down menu
private session. In Safari, extensions are enabled by default in the private
mode. Figure 5 shows the Safari extension listing all websites that were
visited in the private mode.
Firefox extension. Similarly, an inspector extension [33] was developed
for Firefox to record detailed user activities in a private session. As with
Safari, the Firefox extensions are enabled in the private mode by default. As
shown in Figure 6, the extension displays all the visited website during the
private navigation.
Internet Explorer Unlike other browsers, the development of IE exten-
sions requires using .Net Framework based languages like C#. The exten-
sion we developed [33] uses the Browser Helper Object (BHO) class, which
provides a rich set of APIs to extend the functionality of IE. In the usual
mode, the extension can obtain the URL and the content of the HTML page,
which is represented in a DOM (Document Object Model) structure. Like in
Chrome, extensions are disabled by default in the private mode. They can be
enabled by a manual operation. However, after we manually enabled exten-
sions in the private mode, we found an enabled extension had only restricted
privilege: in particular, it could no longer invoke the BHO class. Hence, our
attack did not work on IE.
4.5. Cross-mode interference
In Chrome, extensions are disabled by default in the private mode. But
extensions in the usual mode are enabled. Since Chrome allows the usual and
private modes to run in parallel, this provides the attacker an opportunity
13
Figure 6: Firefox extension recording visited websites in the private mode
to exploit the cross-mode interference.
The attack was motivated by the following observation: the Chrome://memory
page displays all the opened tabs in the browser regardless if they are in the
usual or private mode (Figure 7). Accordingly, we developed an extension
using the standard Chrome extension APIs [31], installed it in the browser,
and left it disabled in the private mode.
The attack works as follows. In the usual mode, the extension is able to
invoke standard APIs to list all tabs, each having a unique ID. If the tab is in
the usual mode, the extension can obtain further details about the tab, such
as the page title and URL. However, if the tab is in the private mode, no
response will be given. But, the precise lack of response provides indication
that the queried tab is in the private mode. By periodically polling the
tabs, the extension can detect the existence of a private browsing session,
the number of active tabs opened in the private mode, when those tabs
are opened and when are they closed. Finally, the extension sends all the
collected data to a remote website (under our control).
In fact, Chrome also provides experimental APIs (which are enabled in the
chrome://flags interface) to further enforce the extension’s functionality
[32]. In particular, it provides the following additional information about
each tab: the CPU consumption, network bandwidth and Frames Per Section
(FPS). This information is obtainable even for tabs in the private mode.
The extra information allows the attacker to draw an even more fine-
grained profile about the user activities within a private session. Figure 8
14
Figure 7: Chrome://memory interface
shows how the user’s activities are correlated with the CPU consumption
and network bandwidth usage. Loading new pages increases the CPU and
bandwidth usage at the same time while scrolling pages only affects the CPU
consumption. When one is watching an HTML5 video, there is a substantial
increase of both the CPU usage and network bandwidth.
We do not test the cross-mode interference for Firefox and Safari, because
extensions are enabled by default in the private mode for both browsers.
Hence, an attacker is better off to steal sensitive information about private
browsing directly through the extension rather than by exploiting the cross-
mode interference.
5. Remote attacks
Based on the threat model explained in Section 3, the fact that a person
used or is using the private mode is considered a privacy feature by itself.
However, existing implementations of private browsing in several browsers
allow a remote website to easily tell if the user is using the private mode.
In this section, we will explain two attacks, based on checking the color of
hyperlinks and the side-channel timing information of writing cookies.
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Figure 8: Profiling the user activities in the private mode based on the CPU and network
usage
5.1. Hyperlink attack
Normally a web browser displays an unvisited hyperlink in blue and
changes it to purple after the user clicks the link or visits the URL. This
is a conventional technique adopted by all browsers to distinguish visited
links from unvisited ones, hence improving the user’s browsing experience
[3].
However, there are noticeable deviations for the same mechanism to work
in the private mode. As we have tested, all browsers started a new private
session with all hyperlinks displayed in blue. In several browsers (Chrome,
Firefox and Safari), the hyperlink never changes colour even after the user
has clicked the link or visited the URL. (One might argue that this has the
benefit of making it more difficult for the remote website to track the visited
pages than in the usual mode since the color of the hyperlink does not change
much; however, it is worth noting that defence against web tracking is not
within the threat model of private browsing.)
These deviations clearly degrade the user experience; furthermore, they
create an exploit path for a remote attacker. Based on the difference in the
hyperlink colours, the remote attacker is able to tell a private mode apart
from a usual mode. As a result, the user may be presented with different
web pages and advertisements (that may contain more adult content). For
example, since in Chrome, Firefox and Safari, the hyperlinks are persistently
16
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Figure 9: Box plots representing timing data collected for browsers under test.
blue in the private mode, a remote website can use JavaScript to check the
colour of the hyperlinks and easily tell if the user is currently in the private
mode. This vulnerability was first reported in [1] and we find it still exists in
the latest versions of the browsers. However, the case of IE is a bit different.
In the latest version of IE, the colour of the hyperlink does change based
on the user’s clicking just like in the usual mode. However, the private
mode still deviates from the usual mode in that the former always displays
all hyperlinks in blue in the beginning of the session. Hence, if the remote
attacker is able to regularly engage with the user in more than one sessions
(e.g., the remote attacker controls a news website), he can easily tell if the
user is in the private mode.
5.2. Timing attack
Timing attacks used to compromise the privacy of Internet users are pre-
sented in the literature [5]. In this section, we describe a novel client-side
timing attack based on leveraging differences in time taken to write a large
number of cookies between usual and private modes.
Implementation. We developed a simple PHP and MySQL application
to measure the time taken to write a predefined number of cookies, and
then store these results to a database for further analysis. The Selenium
testing framework [30] was used to automate testing enabling large-scale
experimentation.
Evaluation. We collected extensive timing measurements for the usual
and private modes (100 samples per mode per browser) as training data
(see Figure 9). Normal distributions are fitted to each training set. The
evaluation is based on using a standard z -test [7], as defined in Equation 1,
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where x is the sample mean, µ is the hypothesised mean, σ is the population
standard deviation6, and n is the sample size.
ztest(µ,X) =
x− µ
σ/
√
n
(1)
We calculate p-values representing the probability that a given observa-
tion belongs to usual or private browsing mode, as follows.
p(x) = F (x|µ = 0, σ = 1) = 1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
|x|
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 dt (2)
We then employ a simple threshold policy where any sample s from
browser b whose p-value for private mode is greater than its p-value for
usual mode by a threshold interval t is categorised as belonging to private
mode. Our approach is outlined in Equation 3, where busual and bprivate are
training sets for browser b in usual and private modes respectively.
f(s, b, t) =
{
Private if p(ztest(s, bprivate)) > p(ztest(s, busual)) + t
Usual else
(3)
We collected further 100 timing measurements for each browser for each
mode in order to evaluate the effectivenss of our approach. There are two
types of errors in the evaluation. One is the False Acceptance Rate (FAR),
that is the rate of a usual browsing session being characterised as private. The
other is False Rejection Rate (FRR), that is the rate of a private browsing
session being characterised as in the usual mode. The two error rates vary
according to the threshold. Hence, in the evaluation, we used the Equal Error
Rate (EER) where the FRR and FAR curves intersect. In the ideal case, the
EER should be close to 50%: i.e., the attacker detects the private/usual
mode no better than tossing a coin. However, as shown in Table 5, with the
exception of IE, a remote attacker is able to correctly identify the browsing
mode with high accuracy.
6Given our large sample size, we approximate the population standard deviation as the
sample standard deviation.
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Browser Equal Error Rate (EER) Threshold (t) Insecurity
(|0.5− EER|)
Google Chrome 1% 0 0.49
Mozilla Firefox 9% 0 0.41
Internet Explorer 63% -0.0002 0.13
Apple Safari 1% 0.0055 0.49
Table 5: Equal Error Rates for detecting the browsing mode. The level of insecurity is
expressed as |0.5− EER|: the bigger the value is, the less secure.
6. Discussion on countermeasures
We divide the causes of attacks into two categories: internal elements
that only concern the internal design of a browser, and external elements
that involve external interactions with the rest of the system.
6.1. Internal elements
Adding bookmarks. Our research shows that adding bookmarks in
the private mode can cause privacy violation in all major browsers with a
varying degree of severity. One countermeasure may be to disallow adding
any bookmarks in the private mode (as implemented in an earlier version of
Chrome 20.0). However, this would cause inconvenience to users; there exist
valid use cases in which a user may want to add a bookmark while in the
private mode. In the existing implementation of private browsing in all ma-
jor browsers, users are completely uninformed about the potential informa-
tion leakage associated with adding bookmarks in the private mode. Hence,
browser vendors should at least add a mechanism to inform the user about
the potential privacy violation before a bookmark is added, e.g., through the
display of a warning dialogue.
SQLite database. We find SQLite temporary files usually remain on
disk in the event of the program crash or power off. In Chrome and Firefox,
the traces left on disk allow an attacker to deduce the occurrence of private
browsing in the past. In Safari, the traces reveal the websites that were
visited in the private session. The browser crash is an edge case as it happens
infrequently in the normal usage. However, for a secure implementation, all
edge cases should be considered. For example, the obvious flaw of the Safari
browser retaining private navigation history in the event of program crash
should have been easily detected in the in-house testing if Apple developers
had included all edge cases into the test framework.
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Extension. We have shown that browser extensions can easily reveal
the user’s activities in the private mode. So far only Chrome and IE disable
extension by default in the private mode. We recommend other browsers
to do the same. Furthermore, when an extension is enabled in the private
mode, the browser should treat it differently as running in the usual mode,
and restrict its privileged access to extension APIs accordingly. Recently,
researchers have made progress in developing an automated tool to verify
the extensions’ compliance with the private browsing mode [8]. Such tool
can prove useful if it is integrated into the web browser, so that only the
compliant extensions can be installed.
Cross-mode interference. Chrome allows the usual and private modes
to run in parallel. However, our research shows that an attacker is able to
obtain user-sensitive information in the private mode by exploiting cross-
mode interference. A safer approach is to run the browser in a single mode
only.
Hyperlinks. Our research shows that for all browsers, a remote attacker
can easily tell if a user is in the private mode by checking the hyperlink
colours. This is because the way a hyperlink is coloured in the private mode
deviates from that in the usual mode. Such deviations clearly degrade the
user experience in the private navigation mode. Furthermore, they do not
seem to provide any real advantage in making private browsing more secure.
On the contrary, based on such deviations, a remote attacker is able to easily
tell a private mode apart from a usual mode. We therefore recommend
browser vendors to remove these deviations. The mechanism for displaying
hyperlinks should be same in the private mode as in the usual mode. The
only difference should be that in the private mode the information about
visited websites is not persistently saved on disk once the session is closed.
Cookie timing. For several browsers, we observed a noticeable difference
in the time spent to write cookies between the usual and private modes.
This difference can be exploited by a remote attacker to tell if the user is
in the private mode. Usually, to mitigate the effects of timing attacks, one
commonly adopted countermeasure is to insert random delays to reduce the
timing difference (e.g, see [9, 10]). The same countermeasure may be applied
here, but we believe it is important to first understand why such differences
exist. Unfortunately, with our current state of knowledge, we cannot fully
explain what caused the timing differences. (One may say writing cookies
should be quicker in the private mode as it is a memory-only operation and
no data is written to the disk. However, that intuitive explanation does not
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seem to apply to Chrome.) More investigation in this aspect is needed.
6.2. External elements
DNS. DNS cache retains the websites visited regardless if they are from
the usual or private mode. Some researchers have already made progress in
developing extensions to clean the DNS cache [21, 22]. It should be possible
for browser vendors to integrate such solutions into the browser, so that
records in the DNS cache related to the private browsing can be sanitised in
an automated manner.
Memory. We have found artifacts in memory left from the private navi-
gation for all browsers under test. It seems browser vendors have all failed to
address this vulnerability, despite that it was reported in 2011 [14]. Clean-
ing all individual data from RAM is a computationally expensive procedure,
which may explain a lack of progress in this area. We are unable to suggest
any solution at this stage; more research is needed in this area.
File timestamps. In the latest versions of Firefox and IE, we did not
observe any timestamp change of files under the profile directory after a
private browsing session. Both browsers chose to read databases into memory
and do not write any new record to the file on the disk. This is a more secure
approach, which we recommend other browsers to follow.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a range of vulnerabilities in the existing implemen-
tations of private browsing across four popular web browsers. The revealed
problems highlight the complexity of the subject and call for more atten-
tion from the security community. They also show that ad-hoc efforts to
implement private browsing – as currently adopted by browser vendors – can
easily lead to important security considerations being ignored. A more sys-
tematic approach to design, implement and test the private browsing feature
is needed – in particular, an appropriate threat model should be established
so to provide a yardstick to measure security; edge cases that happen infre-
quently (e.g., application crash, user adding bookmarks) should be included
in the test framework; extensions should be disabled in the private mode by
default (otherwise, there must be some automated tool, like the one devel-
oped in [8], to strictly ensure the extensions’ compliance with the private
model); the browser should be run in a single mode to avoid any cross-mode
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interference; deviations between the private and usual modes should be min-
imized as much as possible so that a remote attacker cannot reliably tell the
two modes apart.
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